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Abstract
We study cryptography based on operator theory, and propose quantum no-
key (QNK) protocols from the perspective of operator theory, then present
a framework of QNK protocols. The framework is expressed in two forms:
trace-preserving quantum operators and natural presentations. Then we de-
fined the information-theoretical security of QNK protocols and the security
of identification keys. Two kinds of QNK protocols are also proposed. The
first scheme is constructed based on unitary transformation, and the other
is constructed based on two multiplicative commutative sets.
Keywords:
quantum cryptography, quantum no-key protocol, man-in-the-middle
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1. Introduction
The earliest group of quantum message oriented protocols is suggested
in [1, 2, 3], which can be regarded as a quantum version of one-time pad,
the sender and the receiver must preshare secretly a classical key. Later, a
public-key encryption scheme of quantum message is proposed [4]. Recently,
this kind of public-key cryptosystems has been developed [5].
Here we consider another technique to securely transmit quantum mes-
sage, so called quantum no-key (QNK) protocol. No-key protocol was first
proposed by Shamir [6]. It is a wonderful idea to transmit classical messages
Email address: yangli@iie.ac.cn (Li Yang)
secretly in public channel, independent of the idea of public-key cryptosys-
tem and that of secret-key cryptosystem. However, the protocol presented
is computationally secure, cannot resists a man-in-the-middle(MIM) attack.
[7, 8] develop a quantum from of no-key protocol based on single-photon
rotations, which can be used to transmit classical and quantum messages
secretly. It can be seen that the security of the QNK protocol is based on
the laws of quantum mechanics, so it is beyond computational hypothesis.
Ref. [9] proposed a protocol based on quantum computing of Boolean func-
tions. This protocols is constructed with inherent identifications in order
to prevent MIM attack. Similar to the idea of QNK protocol, Kanamori
et al.[11] proposed a protocol for secure data communication, Kye et al.[12]
proposed a quantum key distribution scheme, and Kak [13] proposed a three-
stage quantum cryptographic protocol for key agreement. Wu and Yang [14]
presents a practical QNK protocol, and studied a new kind of attack named
unbalance-of-information-source (UIS) attack. This kind of attack may also
be effective to quantum secure direct communication protocols, such as those
in [15, 16, 17, 18].
In the paper, the theory of QNK protocols is studied, and a framework
of QNK protocols is presented. Then we defined the information-theoretical
security of QNK protocols, and the security of identification keys. Finally,
two kinds of QNK protocols are presented.
2. Quantum no-key protocols
2.1. Framework
Let us consider a general framework of quantum no-key protocol, in which
two ancillary states are used. Suppose Alice will send quantum message ρ ∈
HM . The ancillary states used by Alice and Bob are ρA and ρB, respectively.
The framework of QNK protocol is described as (see Figure 1):
1. Alice randomly prepare a quantum state ρA, then performs UA on the
quantum states ρA⊗ ρ and gets UA(ρA⊗ ρ)U
†
A. Then she sends to Bob
the first cipher state ρ1,
ρ1 = trA(UA(ρA ⊗ ρ)U
†
A) , EA(ρ).
She retains the state ρ′A = trM(UA(ρA ⊗ ρ)U
†
A).
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Figure 1: A general framework of quantum no key protocol. This figure is divided into
two part by a dashed line. The part above the dashed line describes Alice’s operations,
and the other part describes Bob’s operations. The quantum state ρ is the plain state, and
ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 represents the three cipher states transmitted between Alice and Bob. ρA, ρB
are two ancillary states generated randomly by Alice and Bob, respectively.
2. Bob randomly prepares a quantum state ρB, then performs UB on the
quantum states ρ1 ⊗ ρB and gets UB(ρ1 ⊗ ρB)U
†
B. Then he sends to
Alice the second cipher state ρ2,
ρ2 = trB(UB(ρ1 ⊗ ρB)U
†
B) , EB(ρ1).
He retains the state ρ′B = trM(UB(ρ1 ⊗ ρB)U
†
B).
3. Alice performs U ′A on ρ
′
A ⊗ ρ2, and sends to Bob the third cipher state
ρ3,
ρ3 = trA(U
′
A(ρ
′
A ⊗ ρ2)U
′†
A ) , E
′
A(ρ2).
4. Bob performs U ′B on ρ3 ⊗ ρ
′
B, and gets the message ρ′,
ρ′ = eiφρ = trB(U
′
B(ρ3 ⊗ ρ
′
B)U
′†
B ) , E
′
B(ρ3).
In the above protocols, the four quantum operations EA, EB, E
′
A, E
′
B are
all trace-preserving quantum operators. This protocol is correct if and only
if the four quantum operators satisfy this condition:
E ′B ◦ E
′
A ◦ EB ◦ EA = e
iφI. (1)
Remark: As a special case, the unitary transformations UA,UB can
be chosen as bitwise controlled-unitary transformations where the message
qubits act as control qubits, and U ′A = U
†
A,U
′
B = U
†
B. In this case, (I ⊗
UB)(UA⊗I) = (UA⊗I)(I⊗UB), and (I⊗U
′
B)(U
′
A⊗I)(I⊗UB)(UA⊗I) = I.
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2.2. Natural Representation
Trace-preserving quantum operator E can be written as the form of operator-
sum representation
E(ρ) =
∑
i
EiρE
†
i . (2)
Its natural representation [19] is
−→
E (ρ) =
∑
i
(Ei ⊗E
∗
i )
−→ρ , B−→ρ , (3)
where −→ρ is a the column vector, and represents the vector form of the density
matrix ρ.
The quantum operations E1 and E2 are trace-preserving quantum op-
erator, and their natural representations are denoted as A,B respectively.
Because trace-preserving quantum operator can be realized physically, the
operators A,B can be realized physically.
Suppose four operatorsA,B,A′, B′ represent the natural representation of
the four trace-preserving quantum operators EA, EB, E
′
A, E
′
B. Next we deduce
the expressions of the natural representation A,B,A′, B′. Let the ancillary
states of Alice and Bob are ρA = ρB = |0〉〈0|, the orthogonal basis on the
ancillary space is the set {ek}k. From the trace-preserving quantum operator
EA(ρ) = trA(UA(|0〉〈0| ⊗ ρ)U
†
A), it can be inferred that
EA(ρ) =
∑
k
〈ek|UA(|0〉〈0| ⊗ ρ)U
†
A|ek〉
=
∑
k
EkρE
†
k,
where Ek ≡ 〈ek|UA|0〉 is an operator acting on the message space HM .
Thus, according to Eq.(3), one know that the natural representation of trace-
preserving quantum operator EA is as follows
A =
∑
k
Ek ⊗ E
∗
k =
∑
k
〈ek|UA|0〉 ⊗ 〈ek|U
∗
A|0〉.
Similarly, one can present the natural representations of the other three trace-
preserving quantum operators, for example B =
∑
k〈ek|UB|0〉 ⊗ 〈ek|U
∗
B|0〉.
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From the above analysis, the four transformations to the quantum mes-
sage ρ in the quantum no-key protocol can be described in the form of natural
representation.
−→ρ −→ −→ρ1 = A
−→ρ
−→ −→ρ2 = B
−→ρ1
−→ −→ρ3 = A
′−→ρ2
−→ −→ρ ′ = B′−→ρ3
Quantum no-key protocol can be described in the form of trace-preserving
quantum operators or natural representation, and the two forms are equiv-
alent. In the following sections, we use the natural representation, and the
operators A and B are both natural representations of trace-preserving quan-
tum operators. E1 ◦ E2 = E2 ◦ E1 if and only if AB = BA.
The additive commutator A,B satisfy
AB = BA+K;
The multiplicative commutator A,B satisfy
BA = eiλAB, λ 6= 0,
or be written as B−1A−1BA = eiλI, λ 6= 0.
When K = λ = 0, the additive commutator equals to multiplicative
commutator. The multiplicative commutator BA = eiλAB is just additive
commutator when λ = 0; Multiplicative commutator is different from addi-
tive commutator in only a global phase eiλ when λ 6= 0, and they have no
difference in physical implementation.
Theorem 1: The multiplicative commutators A,B are unitary matrices.
If BA = eiλAB, where λ 6= 0, then the sum of the eigenvalues of the operators
A,B are zero, respectively.
Proof It means to prove: if A =
∑
j e
iϕj |aj〉〈aj|, then
∑
j e
iϕj = 0; if
B =
∑
j e
iφj |bj〉〈bj|, then
∑
j e
iφj = 0. The proof is as follows.
From BA = eiφABAB where A,B are both unitary, one know that A =
eiφABB†AB. Because A is a unitary transformation, it has spectral decompo-
sition A =
∑
j λj |j〉〈j|, and each eigenvalue λj can be written as e
iφj . Thus,∑
j λj|j〉〈j| =
∑
j e
iφABλjB
†|j〉〈j|B. Then
λk =
∑
j
eiφABλj〈k|B
†|j〉〈j|B|k〉 =
∑
j
eiφABλj |〈j|B|k〉|
2. (4)
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Let the j-th row and k-th column of B is bjk. The two side of Eq.(4) is
added with the variable k, and obtains
∑
k λk = e
iφAB
∑
j λj
∑
k |bjk|
2 =
eiφAB
∑
j λj. Thus,
∑
j λj(e
iφAB − 1) = 0. If φAB 6= 0, then
∑
j λj = 0, that
means the sum of the eigenvalues of A is 0. Similarly, one can prove that the
sum of the eigenvalues of B is 0. 
In the next part of this paper, we consider the case that A′ = A−1, B′ =
B−1. In this case, Eq.(1) can also be expressed as B−1A−1BA = eiφI. It can
be seen that A,B are multiplicative commutator.
In order to identify personal identification in the protocols, Alice and
Bob must preshare a secret key k, i, and the multiplicative commutator A,B
should satisfy:
B−1A−1BA = eiφNk(i). (5)
Alice and Bob preshare secret identification key k, i, where k ∈ K. From the
value of k, a operator Nk can be obtained and a set I(k) can be constructed,
and the secret key i ∈ I(k). From k, i, we can get a set L(k, i) and a set of
operators satisfying
Sk(i) = {A
(i)
l (k)|l ∈ L(k, i)} ∪ {B
(i)
l (k)|l ∈ L(k, i)}. (6)
The set of operators Sk(i) should satisfy the condition: for any two elements
A
(i)
l1
(k), B
(i)
l2
(k) ∈ Sk(i), it holds that
[B
(i)
l2
(k)]−1[A
(i)
l1
(k)]−1B
(i)
l2
(k)A
(i)
l1
(k) = eiφ(l1,l2)Nk(i). (7)
Alice and Bob communicates according to k, i and the set Sk(i). The
process is as follows
1. Alice randomly selects l1 ∈ L(k, i), and performs an operator A
(i)
l1
(k)
on quantum message −→ρ , then obtains a state −→ρ1 . She sends it to Bob.
2. Bob randomly selects l2 ∈ L(k, i), and performs an operator B
(i)
l2
(k) on
quantum state −→ρ1 , then obtains a state
−→ρ2 . He sends it to Alice.
3. According to l1, Alice performs an operator [A
(i)
l1
(k)]−1 on quantum
state −→ρ2 , then obtains a state
−→ρ3 . She sends it to Bob.
4. According to l2, Bob performs an operator [B
(i)
l2
(k)]−1 on quantum state
−→ρ3 , then obtains a state
−→ρ4 .
From the condition satisfied by Sk(i), it is deduced that
−→ρ4 = [B
(i)
l2
(k)]−1[A
(i)
l1
(k)]−1B
(i)
l2
(k)A
(i)
l1
(k)−→ρ = eiφ(l1,l2)Nk(i)
−→ρ . (8)
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Thus, the quantum state obtained by Bob in the end is Nk(i)
−→ρ . He can
recovery the quantum message −→ρ by performing the inverse transformation
of Nk(i).
Through the value of l1 is unknown by Bob, Bob randomly selects a value
of l′1 ∈ L(k, i), then it can satisfy the relation in Eq.(7)(only a little difference
on total phase). Thus, the inverse transformation of Nk(i) can also be replace
by
N−1k (i) = [A
(i)
l′
1
(k)]−1[B
(i)
l2
(k)]−1A
(i)
l′
1
(k)B
(i)
l2
(k), ∀l′1 ∈ L(k, i).
Because the operators A
(i)
l (k), B
(i)
l (k) are all trace-preserving quantum op-
erators and can be implemented physically, the quantum operator N−1k is
physically implementable. Thus, Bob can recovery the quantum message −→ρ
by performing N−1k (i) on the state
−→ρ4 .
In order to enhance the security of this protocol, we can select a group
of similarity transformations {Ti|i ∈ L(k, i)}. The set Sk(i) in the above
protocol is replaced with another set
S˜k(i) = {TiA
(i)
l (k)T
−1
i |l ∈ L(k, i)} ∪ {TiB
(i)
l (k)T
−1
i |l ∈ L(k, i)}. (9)
Similarly, Nk(i) is replaced with TiNk(i)T
−1
i , but it is still denoted as Nk(i)
for convenient. Then according to Eq.(7), we know
Ti[B
(i)
l2
(k)]−1[A
(i)
l1
(k)]−1B
(i)
l2
(k)A
(i)
l1
(k)T−1i = e
iφ(l1,l2)Nk(i).
From the following relation
Ti[B
(i)
l2
(k)]−1[A
(i)
l1
(k)]−1B
(i)
l2
(k)A
(i)
l1
(k)T−1i
=[TiB
(i)
l2
(k)T−1i ]
−1[TiA
(i)
l1
(k)T−1i ]
−1TiB
(i)
l2
(k)T−1i TiA
(i)
l1
(k)T−1i , (10)
it is inferred that: any two elements in S˜k(i) such as TiA
(i)
l1
(k)T−1i , TiB
(i)
l2
(k)T−1i
satisfy the following relation
[TiB
(i)
l2
(k)T−1i ]
−1[TiA
(i)
l1
(k)T−1i ]
−1TiB
(i)
l2
(k)T−1i TiA
(i)
l1
(k)T−1i = e
iφ(l1,l2)Nk(i).
(11)
2.3. Security
In QNK protocol, there are 3 times of transmitting quantum ciphers
through public quantum channel. Denote ρi as the i-th quantum cipher with
respect to the attackers, where i = 1, 2, 3.
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Definition 1: QNK protocol is information-theoretically secure, if the
three quantum ciphers ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 satisfy the following condition: for any pos-
itive polynomial p(.), and all sufficiently big number n, it holds that
D (ρi, ρj) <
1
p(n)
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (12)
where ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 are all n-qubit ciphers.
In fact, this definition equals to the following definition.
Definition 2: QNK protocol is information-theoretically secure, if the
three quantum ciphers ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 satisfy the following condition: there exists a
quantum state τ , such that for any positive polynomial p(.) and all sufficiently
big number n, it holds that
D (ρi, τ) <
1
p(n)
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (13)
where ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 are all n-qubit ciphers.
In one hand, if QNK protocol satisfies Definition 2, it can be deduced
thatD (ρi, ρj) < D (ρi, τ)+D (ρj , τ) <
2
p(n)
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then the protocol
satisfies Definition 1; In the other hand, if QNK protocol satisfies Definition 1,
and let τ = ρ1, we know that D (ρi, τ) = D (ρi, ρ1) <
1
p(n)
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then
the protocol satisfies Definition 2. Thus, the two definitions are equivalent
to each other.
Here, ρi is the i-th quantum cipher with respect to the attackers, where
i = 1, 2, 3. In the QNK protocol, −→ρ1 is obtained by performing quantum
transformation A
(i)
l1
(k) on quantum state −→ρ . However, with regard to the
attackers, the random number l1 and authentication key i, k used by Alice
cannot be obtained, so
−→ρ1 =
∑
i,k,l1
pipkpl1A
(i)
l1
(k)−→ρ ,
where pi, pk are the probability of selecting the authentication key i, k, and
pl1 is the probability of the local number l1 being selected by Alice. Similarly,
the attackers cannot obtain the random number l2 and authentication key
i, k used by Bob, so
−→ρ2 =
∑
i,k,l1,l2
pipkpl1pl2B
(i)
l2
(k)A
(i)
l1
(k)−→ρ ,
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where pl2 is the probability of the local number l2 being selected by Bob.
−→ρ3 =
∑
i,k,l1,l2
pipkpl1pl2(A
(i)
l1
(k))−1B
(i)
l2
(k)A
(i)
l1
(k)−→ρ .
Definition 3: QNK protocol is information-theoretically secure, if the
three operators
∑
i,k,l1
pipkpl1A
(i)
l1
(k),
∑
i,k,l1,l2
pipkpl1pl2B
(i)
l2
(k)A
(i)
l1
(k), and∑
i,k,l1,l2
pipkpl1pl2(A
(i)
l1
(k))−1B
(i)
l2
(k)A
(i)
l1
(k) satisfy the condition: for any pos-
itive polynomial p(.), and all sufficiently large number n, it holds that
||
∑
i,k,l1
pipkpl1A
(i)
l1
(k)−
∑
i,k,l1,l2
pipkpl1pl2B
(i)
l2
(k)A
(i)
l1
(k)||♦ <
1
p(n)
,
||
∑
i,k,l1,l2
pipkpl1pl2
(
B
(i)
l2
(k)A
(i)
l1
(k)− (A
(i)
l1
(k))−1B
(i)
l2
(k)A
(i)
l1
(k)
)
||♦ <
1
p(n)
,
||
∑
i,k,l1
pipkpl1A
(i)
l1
(k)−
∑
i,k,l1,l2
pipkpl1pl2(A
(i)
l1
(k))−1B
(i)
l2
(k)A
(i)
l1
(k)||♦ <
1
p(n)
.
where the notation || ∗ ||♦ represents diamond norm.
It is obvious that a sufficient condition for information-theoretical security
is as follow:
||I −
∑
l2
pl2B
(i)
l2
(k)||♦ <
1
p(n)
, ∀i, k,
||I − A
(i)
l1
(k)−1||♦ <
1
p(n)
, ∀i, k, l1,
||I −
∑
l2
pl2(A
(i)
l1
(k))−1B
(i)
l2
(k)||♦ <
1
p(n)
, ∀i, k, l1.
For the QNK protocol which uses authentication key, when considering its
security, besides analyzing the security of quantum message, we also should
analyze the security of the authentication key. Here we present a definition
of the security of authentication key in QNK protocol.
Definition 4: The authentication key in QNK protocol is secure, if for
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any positive polynomial p(.), and all sufficiently large number n, it holds that
||
∑
l1
A
(i1)
l1
(k1)−
∑
l1
A
(i2)
l1
(k2)||♦ <
1
p(n)
, ∀i1, i2, k1, k2.
||
∑
l1,l2
B
(i1)
l2
(k1)A
(i1)
l1
(k1)−
∑
l1,l2
B
(i2)
l2
(k2)A
(i2)
l1
(k2)||♦ <
1
p(n)
, ∀i1, i2, k1, k2.
||
∑
l1,l2
(A
(i1)
l1
(k1))
−1B
(i1)
l2
(k1)A
(i1)
l1
(k1)−
∑
l1,l2
(A
(i2)
l1
(k2))
−1B
(i2)
l2
(k2)A
(i2)
l1
(k2)||♦
<
1
p(n)
, ∀i1, i2, k1, k2.
3. Two schemes of quantum no-key protocols
3.1. First scheme
Unitary transformation is a special kind of trace-preserving quantum op-
erator. Here we assume the quantum operators used by Alice and Bob
in QNK protocols are all unitary. Let Nk(i) = I. The sets of operators
{Al|l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nA}} and {Bk|k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nB}} are natural representa-
tions of unitary operator used by Alice and Bob. The two set satisfy the
relation:
B−1l2 A
−1
l1
Bl2Al1 = e
iφ(l1,l2)I. (14)
The above formula can also be written as Bl2Al1 = e
iφ(l1,l2)Al1Bl2 .
Al, Bk are natural representations of unitary operators. So we can assume
Al = El ⊗ E
∗
l , Bk = Fk ⊗ F
∗
k , where El, Fk are unitary transformations, and
l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nA}, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nB}. Then
B−1l2 A
−1
l1
Bl2Al1 = (Fl2 ⊗ F
∗
l2
)−1(El1 ⊗E
∗
l1
)−1(Fl2 ⊗ F
∗
l2
)(El1 ⊗ E
∗
l1
)
= (F−1l2 E
−1
l1
Fl2El1)⊗ (F
−1
l2
E−1l1 Fl2El1)
∗
, Vl1,l2 ⊗ V
∗
l1,l2
, (15)
where Vl1,l2 = F
−1
l2
E−1l1 Fl2El1 is unitary transformation. According to Eq.(14),
we have Vl1,l2 ⊗ V
∗
l1,l2
= eiφ(l1,l2)I22n . From the identity I22n = I2n ⊗ I2n ,
it has Vl1,l2 ⊗ V
∗
l1,l2
= aI2n ⊗ bI2n , where ab = e
iφ(l1,l2), and b = a∗. So
eiφ(l1,l2) = aa∗ = |a|2, then eiφ(l1,l2) = 1. That means it is impossible to
produce a global phase in Eq.(14). Thus the Eq.(14) is rewritten as follows
B−1l2 A
−1
l1
Bl2Al1 = I. (16)
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Based on this relation, we construct a QNK scheme, which is described
as follows.
Firstly, two sets of operators are selected, such as
S(A) = {Al|l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nA}},
S(B) = {Bk|k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nB}}.
By using the two sets, Alice and Bob communicate following this QNK
protocol.
1. Alice randomly selects a number l1 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nA}, then performs
quantum operator Al1 on quantum message
−→ρ , and obtains the state
−→ρ1 . She sends it to Bob.
2. Bob randomly selects a number l2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nB}, then performs
quantum operator Bl2 on quantum message
−→ρ1 , and obtains the state
−→ρ2 . He sends it to Alice.
3. According to the value of l1, Alice performs quantum operator A
−1
l1
(or
A
†
l1
) on quantum message −→ρ2 , and obtains the state
−→ρ3 . She sends it to
Bob.
4. According to the value of l2, Bob performs quantum operator B
−1
l2
(or
B
†
l2
) on quantum message −→ρ3 , and obtains the state
−→ρ4 .
According to the relation (Eq.(16)) of the two sets S(A), S(B), we know
that
−→ρ4 = B
−1
l2
A−1l1 Bl2Al1
−→ρ = −→ρ .
Thus, the quantum state obtained by Bob’s performing quantum transfor-
mation B−1l2 is just the quantum message sent by Alice.
3.2. Second scheme
Denote the operation of two operators A,B: (A,B) = B−1A−1BA.
Suppose there exists two groups of operators S(A) = {Ai|i = 1, · · · , nA}
and S(B) = {Bi|i = 1, · · · , nB}, which satisfy the following condition
(Ai, Bj) = N, ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , nA}, j ∈ {1, · · · , nB}, (17)
where N is an operator that is independent of i, j.
11
Proposition 1: Suppose two sets of operators S(A), S(B) satisfy the
condition Eq.(17), then the following relations hold: ∀i, j
(A−1i , BjB
−1
i ) = I, (18)
(A−1j , BjB
−1
i ) = I, (19)
(Bi, AjA
−1
i ) = I, (20)
(Bj , AjA
−1
i ) = I. (21)
Proof: See the appendix. 
Proposition 2: Suppose two sets of operators S(A), S(B) satisfy the
condition Eq.(17), then the following relations hold: ∀i, j, k, l
(AiAj, BkBl) = (A
2
j , B
2
l ). (22)
Proof: See the appendix. 
According to Proposition 2, we know the relation (Al1Ak1 , Bl2Bk2) =
(A2k1, B
2
k2
). Based on this relation, a QNK scheme is constructed as follows.
Suppose the set of similarity transformations {Ti|i ∈ I} is selected.
Firstly we construct a set of operators Sk(i) as follows:
Sk1||k2(i) = {TiAlAk1T
−1
i |l ∈ {1, · · · , nA}}
∪{TiBlBk2T
−1
i |l ∈ {1, · · · , nB}}. (23)
In the set Sk(i), any two elements A
(i)
l1
(k1||k2) = TiAl1Ak1T
−1
i andB
(i)
l2
(k1||k2) =
TiBl2Bk2T
−1
i satisfy the following relation
(A
(i)
l1
(k1||k2), B
(i)
l2
(k1||k2)) = (TiAl1Ak1T
−1
i , TiBl2Bk2T
−1
i )
= Ti(Al1Ak1, Bl2Bk2)T
−1
i
= Ti(A
2
k1
, B2k2)T
−1
i . (24)
Denote Nk1||k2 = (A
2
k1
, B2k2), Nk1||k2(i) = TiNk1||k2T
−1
i , then
(A
(i)
l1
(k1||k2), B
(i)
l2
(k1||k2)) = Nk1||k2(i), ∀l1, l2. (25)
Alice and Bob communicate according to k1||k2, i (k1 ∈ {1, · · · , nA}, k2 ∈
{1, · · · , nB}, i ∈ I) and the set of operators Sk1||k2(i). The process is as
follows.
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1. Alice randomly selects a number l1 ∈ {1, · · · , nA}, and performs quan-
tum transformation A
(i)
l1
(k1||k2) on quantum message
−→ρ , then obtains
−→ρ1 . She sends it Bob.
2. Bob randomly selects a number l2 ∈ {1, · · · , nB}, and performs quan-
tum transformation B
(i)
l2
(k1||k2) on quantum state
−→ρ1 , then obtains
−→ρ2 .
He sends it to Alice.
3. According to l1, Alice performs quantum transformation [A
(i)
l1
(k1||k2)]
−1
on quantum state −→ρ2 , and obtains
−→ρ3 . She sends it to Bob.
4. According to l2, Bob performs quantum transformation [B
(i)
l2
(k1||k2)]
−1
on quantum state −→ρ3 , and obtains
−→ρ4 .
From the condition satisfied by Sk1||k2(i), it can be deduced that
−→ρ4 = Nk1||k2(i)
−→ρ = Ti(A
2
k1
, B2k2)T
−1
i
−→ρ . (26)
Bob performs the inverse transformation ofNk1||k2(i), which is [Nk1||k2(i)]
−1 =
Ti(B
2
k2
, A2k1)T
−1
i , then the quantum message
−→ρ is recovered.
Proposition 3: (Aj1Aj2Aj3, Bi1Bi2Bi3) = (Aj3Aj2Aj3, Bi3Bi2Bi3), ∀i1, i2, i3,
∀j1, j2, j3.
Proof: See the appendix. 
According to Proposition 3, we know the relation (Al1Ak1Ak2, Bl2Bk3Bk4) =
(Ak2Ak1Ak2 , Bk4Bk3Bk4). Suppose the set of similarity transformations {Ti|i ∈
I} is selected. We construct the set of operators Sk(i) as follows:
Sk1||k2||k3||k4(i) = {TiAlAk1Ak2T
−1
i |l = 1, · · · , nA}
∪{TiBlBk3Bk4T
−1
i |l = 1, · · · , nB}. (27)
When the set of operators Sk1||k2||k3||k4(i) is used in the QNK communication,
l is a random number selected locally, and k1, k2, k3, k4, i are authentication
keys preshared by Alice and Bob. If Alice selects a local random number
l1, then she should perform quantum transformation TiAl1Ak1Ak2T
−1
i ; if Bob
selects a local random number l2, then he should perform quantum trans-
formation TiBl2Bk3Bk4T
−1
i . The detailed process of the three interactive
communication is the same as the last scheme. After the fourth step, Bob
obtains a quantum state
−→ρ4 = Ti(Ak2Ak1Ak2 , Bk4Bk3Bk4)T
−1
i
−→ρ . (28)
Then Bob performs quantum transformation Ti(Bk4Bk3Bk4, Ak2Ak1Ak2)T
−1
i
and obtains the quantum message −→ρ sent by Alice.
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In general, we have the following relation
(Al1Ak1Ak2 · · ·Akn , Bl2Bk′1Bk′2 · · ·Bk′n) = (AknAk1Ak2 · · ·Akn, Bk′nBk′1Bk′2 · · ·Bk′n).
(29)
According to this relation, a new QNK scheme can be constructed similarly.
In the new scheme, more operators can be used by Alice and Bob.
3.3. Construction of the sets S(A) and S(B)
Suppose there exists two groups of operators such as S(A) = {Ai|i =
1, · · · , nA} and S(B) = {Bi|i = 1, · · · , nB}, and they satisfy the relation ex-
pressed in Eq.(17), then A−1i BjAi = BjN, ∀j. Thus A
−1
i1
BjAi1 = A
−1
i2
BjAi2 .
That is
(Ai2A
−1
i1
)Bj = Bj(Ai2A
−1
i1
), (30)
or written as (Ai2A
−1
i1
, Bj) = I or [Ai2A
−1
i1
, Bj ] = 0. (Denote [A,B] = AB −
BA)
According to Eq.(17) and the similar deduction, it can be inferred that
∀i, j, k,
[AiA
−1
j , Bk] = 0, (31)
[AiA
−1
j , B
−1
k ] = 0, (32)
[BiB
−1
j , Ak] = 0, (33)
[BiB
−1
j , A
−1
k ] = 0, (34)
From [AiA
−1
j , Bk] = 0, ∀i, j, k, it can be deduced that
[AiA
−1
j , BkB
−1
l ] = [AiA
−1
j , Bk]B
−1
l +Bk[AiA
−1
j , B
−1
l ] = 0 + 0 = 0. (35)
That means (AiA
−1
j , BkB
−1
l ) = I, ∀Ai, Aj ∈ S(A), Bk, Bl ∈ S(B).
Thus, we can extend the two sets of operators S(A), S(B) to two new
sets of operators S˜(A), S˜(B) as follows:
S˜(A) = {Ai||j = AiA
−1
j |Ai, Aj ∈ S(A)}, (36)
S˜(B) = {Bi||j = BiB
−1
j |Bi, Bj ∈ S(B)}, (37)
According to Eq.(35), if we select one element from each of the two new sets
S˜(A), S˜(B), such as Ai||j, Bk||l (where i, j ∈ {1, · · · , nA}, k, l ∈ {1, · · · , nB}),
then the two elements satisfy the relation (Ai||j, Bk||l) = I. Thus, the new
sets extended from S(A), S(B) can also be used in QNK protocol.
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When nA = nB = 2, the extended sets of operators are S˜(A) = {A1A
−1
2 ,
A2A
−1
1 , A1A
−1
1 = I, A1A
−1
1 = I} and S˜(B) = {B1B
−1
2 , B2B
−1
1 , B1B
−1
1 =
I, B1B
−1
1 = I}. Because the identity operator I in the two sets is meaning-
less, the number of the operators in the two extended sets does not increase
through the above method (The number of the operators in each set remains
2). Thus the extension is meaningless. However, the extension is meaningful
when nA, nB ≥ 3.
4. Discussions and Conclusions
We study the theory of quantum no-key protocols. Firstly, a framework
of quantum no-key protocols is presented. The framework is expressed in
two forms: trace-preserving quantum operators and natural presentations.
Secondly, we defined the information-theoretical security of quantum no-
key protocol, and the security of authentication keys. Finally, two kinds of
quantum no-key protocols are presented. In the first scheme, the quantum
operators used by Alice and Bob are all unitary. In the second scheme,
Alice and Bob use trace-preserving quantum operators, and the two sets of
operators used by Alice and Bob are constructed based on two multiplicative
commutative sets.
In the paper, there exists the following questions.
1. k, i are secret identification key. How to use them to identify the per-
sonal identification of Alice, Bob, or attackers. How to identify in each
of the three transformations?
2. How to construct operator Nk and a set I(k) from a given number k?
3. How to construct a set L(k, i) and a set of operators Sk(i) from the
given k and i ∈ I(k)?
4. In the quantum no-key protocols, the numbers l1, l2 ∈ L(k, i) are se-
lected randomly. Whether the random selection of l1, l2 can prevent
from the leakage of identification keys k ∈ K and i ∈ I(k) during the
communication?
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Appendix
Proposition 1: Suppose two sets of operators S(A), S(B) satisfy the
condition Eq.(17), then the following relations hold: ∀i, j
(A−1i , BjB
−1
i ) = I, (38)
(A−1j , BjB
−1
i ) = I, (39)
(Bi, AjA
−1
i ) = I, (40)
(Bj , AjA
−1
i ) = I. (41)
Proof: According to the condition Eq.(17), ∀i 6= j
(Ai, Bi) = N,
(Ai, Bj) = N,
(Aj , Bi) = N,
(Aj , Bj) = N.
From the identity (Ai, Bi) = N = (Ai, Bj), it can be deduced B
−1
i A
−1
i BiAi =
B−1j A
−1
i BjAi, then
B−1i A
−1
i Bi = B
−1
j A
−1
i Bj.
Thus, it can be known that (BjB
−1
i )A
−1
i = A
−1
i (BjB
−1
i ), that is (A
−1
i , BjB
−1
i ) =
I.
The other three relations can be obtained in the same way. 
Proposition 2: Suppose two sets of operators S(A), S(B) satisfy the
condition Eq.(17), then the following relations hold: ∀i, j, k, l
(AiAj, BkBl) = (A
2
j , B
2
l ). (42)
Proof: In the deduction of this proof, the four identities such as BlAi =
AiBlN (that is (Ai, Bl) = N), A
−1
i BkAi = BkN (that is (Ai, Bk) = N),
B−1k A
−1
j Bk = B
−1
l A
−1
j Bl, and BlN = A
−1
j BlAj (that is (Aj, Bl) = N) are
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used in turn. The deduction is as follows. ∀i, j, k, l,
(AiAj , BkBl) = (B
−1
l B
−1
k )(A
−1
j A
−1
i )BkBlAiAj
= (B−1l B
−1
k )A
−1
j A
−1
i BkAiBlNAj
= B−1l B
−1
k A
−1
j BkNBlNAj
= B−1l B
−1
l A
−1
j BlNBlNAj
= (B−1l )
2A−1j A
−1
j BlAjA
−1
j BlAjAj
= (B−1l )
2(A−1j )
2B2l A
2
j
= (A2j , B
2
l ).

Proposition 3: (Aj1Aj2Aj3, Bi1Bi2Bi3) = (Aj3Aj2Aj3, Bi3Bi2Bi3), ∀i1, i2, i3,
∀j1, j2, j3.
Proof: It can be inferred from the formula A−1i BkAi = A
−1
j BkAj that
A−1i Bk1Bk2Bk3Ai = A
−1
i Bk1AiA
−1
i Bk2AiA
−1
i Bk3Ai
= A−1j Bk1AjA
−1
j Bk2AjA
−1
j Bk3Aj
= A−1j Bk1Bk2Bk3Aj.
Similarly, it can be inferred
B−1i A
−1
k1
A−1k2 A
−1
k3
Bi = B
−1
j A
−1
k1
A−1k2 A
−1
k3
Bj. (43)
Thus, the following result holds
(Aj1Aj2Aj3 , Bi1Bi2Bi3) = B
−1
i3
B−1i2 B
−1
i1
A−1j3 A
−1
j2
A−1j1 Bi1Bi2Bi3Aj1Aj2Aj3
= B−1i3 B
−1
i2
B−1i1 A
−1
j3
A−1j2 A
−1
j2
Bi1Bi2Bi3Aj2Aj2Aj3
= B−1i3 B
−1
i2
B−1i2 A
−1
j3
A−1j2 A
−1
j2
Bi2Bi2Bi3Aj2Aj2Aj3
= B−1i3 B
−1
i2
B−1i2 A
−1
j3
A−1j2 A
−1
j3
Bi2Bi2Bi3Aj3Aj2Aj3
= B−1i3 B
−1
i2
B−1i3 A
−1
j3
A−1j2 A
−1
j3
Bi3Bi2Bi3Aj3Aj2Aj3
= (Aj3Aj2Aj3, Bi3Bi2Bi3).

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